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NOTES AND COMMENTS

Instead of § 1033 extending an advantage to the corporation which
incurs a casualty, this reinvestment provision may well be placing
that corporation at a disadvantage vis-a-vis ahother corporation
which voluntarily converts its property. Thus, the Sixth Circuit's
position that § 1033 always provides a viable alternative seems
overly narrow-minded. It ignores the converse situation when reinvestment is not feasible, and imposes upon the corporation incurring
a preliquidation plan casualty a decision which is clearly not in the
best interests of either the corporation or its shareholders. Central
Tablet may well place it at a severe disadvantage.
Several compelling and persuasive arguments have been presented in favor of extending § 337 to the pre-liquidation plan casualty. Rather than weighing these arguments on their merits, consideration can be given to the threshold problem of the breadth of this
remedial statute, as was done by the Sixth Circuit in Central Tablet.
It seems fair to conclude that Congress did not specifically intend to
permit the desired application and that the Central Tablet court
properly found strong grounds for looking no further. The Morton
court, desiring to deal equitably with the taxpayer within the framework of the statute, found congressional intent sufficiently broad to
permit a decision on the merits. While the Supreme Court may construe the amplitude of Congress' original purpose, the most desirable
solution may be for Congress itself to consider the issue and, if it
agrees with the arguments for the taxpayer, amend the statute so as
to afford § 337 treatment in this situation.

DAVID M. BRADT, JR.

UNION DISCIPLINE OF SUPERVISORY
PERSONNEL
Although management and its representatives may often be confronted with various types of union pressure, they are protected from
undue union coercion by the existing federal labor laws. Section
8(b) (1) (B) of the National Labor Relations Act provides: "It shall be
an unfair labor practice for any labor organization or its agents...
to restrain or coerce. . . an employer in the selection of his representatives for the purposes of collective bargaining or the adjustment of
grievances."' Since the addition of the Taft-Hartley Amendments to
the National Labor Relations Act, supervisory personnel have been
'29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(1)(B) (1970).
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deemed management representatives if the supervisors are either
collective bargaining agents or grievance adjustors. 2 Supervisors are
3
also excluded from the "employee" classification under the NLRA,
but are not prohibited by the NLRA from union membership.' When
an employer seeks potential candidates for supervisory positions, he
may prefer individuals who have knowledge of the plant operations
and a good relationship with the other employees. Consequently, the
company may choose to select its supervisory personnel from the
union ranks. The supervisors may also wish to retain the benefits they
have accrued through union membership and to continue their affiliation with the union.5 However, supervisors may be confronted with
a problem of divided loyalties when they are permitted by management to remain in the union.' The conflict arises when a supervisor
is called upon by management to perform tasks which would require
him to act in a manner that would be inconsistent with the regulations of the union to which the supervisor belongs.
A particularly acute question has been whether a union may fine
or expel supervisor-members for crossing picket lines to perform
struck work. 7 The District of Columbia Circuit in IBEWLocal 134 v.
'The courts have often found an employer liable for the acts of his supervisors and
foremen because these supervisory personnel exercised managerial duties. See, e.g.,
Daniel Constr. Co. v. NLRB, 341 F.2d 805 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 831 (1965);
NLRB v. Gardner Constr. Co., 296 F.2d 146 (10th Cir. 1961); NLRB v. Birmingham
Publishing Co., 262 F.2d 2 (5th Cir. 1959).
An employer's representatives may be protected under the NLRA because they
are classified as managerial personnel. See, e.g., Meat Cutters Union, Local 81 v.
NLRB, 458 F.2d 794 (D.C. Cir. 1972); NLRB v. New Mexico Dist. Council of Carpenters, 454 F.2d 1116 (10th Cir. 1972); NLRB v. Toledo Locals 15-P and 272,
Lithographers, 437 F.2d 55 (6th Cir. 1971).
'Section 2(3) provides: The term 'employee' shall include any employee . . . but
shall not include any individual employed as . . . a supervisor
29 U.S.C.
§ 152(3) (1970).
'Section 14(a) states: "Nothing herein shall prohibit any individual employed as
a supervisor from becoming or remaining a member of a labor organization .
29
U.S.C. § 164(a) (1970).
'One method used to insure a continuation of benefits is to allow supervisors to
hold participating withdrawal cards which will entitle them to retain, for example,
death, pension and disability benefits. However, honorary withdrawal cards may only
signify that the supervisors are assured of a resumption of benefits in the event they
return to the ranks of regular employees. See note 38 infra.
'Supervisors are not protected from discharge by the employer solely because they
are members of the union. NLRB v. North Ark. Elec. Co-op Inc., 446 F.2d 602 (8th
Cir. 1971). At the same time, supervisory personnel may still involve the employer in
an unfair labor practice against the union, and the fact that supervisors belong to the
union does not negate their position as management representatives. See note 2 supra.
'Any work performed for a strike-bound employer which would normally be
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NLRB8 and the Seventh Circuit in NLRB v. IBEW Local 21501 have
recently been confronted with this question. Their decisions present
contrasting views as to the status of supervisory personnel during a
management-union conflict and the power of the union to fine or
expel these members. The principle dispute appears to result from
the District of Columbia Circuit's literal reading of § 8(b)(1)(B) as
opposed to the Seventh Circuit's broad application of that section.
While the wording of § 8(b)(1) (B) is far from clear, a careful analysis
of the Seventh Circuit's opinion and the previous decisions of the
National Labor Relations Board seems to reveal a workable framework within which subsequent problems in this area may be handled
in a consistent and orderly fashion.
Union discipline of employees has long been a source of conflicting
judicial decisions' ° and the subject of a great deal of academic debate." Prior to the 1947 Taft-Hartley Amendments to the NLRA,
supervisors were considered to be within the general definition of
employees. 12 However, with the removal of supervisors from the employee classification, a confusing body of law has been created con3
cerning the status of supervisory personnel.
handled by the striking employees is struck work. See, e.g., Laborers' Int'l Union,
Local 859 v. NLRB, 446 F.2d 1319, 1321 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
-83 L.R.R.M. 2582 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
'83 L.R.R.M. 2827 (7th Cir. 1973).
"°See, e.g., NLRB v. Furriers Joint Council, 224 F.2d 78 (2d Cir. 1955) (union could
prevent employees from working when those employees had violated the provisions of
the collective bargaining agreement); NLRB v. International Longshoremen's Union,
210 F.2d 581 (9th Cir. 1954) (union could not expel union members for reasons other
than nonpayment of dues when the expulsion affected the employees' job status);
American Newspaper Publishers Ass'n v. NLRB, 193 F.2d 782 (7th Cir. 1951), aff'd,
345 U.S. 100 (1953) (union could lawfully threaten to expel employees from the union).
"See generally Christener, Union Discipline Under FederalLaw, 43 N.Y.U.L. REv.
227 (1968); Gould, Some Limitations Upon Union Discipline Underthe NationalLabor
Relations Act: The Radiation of Allis-Chalmers, 1970 DUKE L.J. 1067; Silard, Labor
Board Regulation of Union Discipline After Allis-Chalmers, Marine Workers and
Scofield, 38 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 187 (1969); Summers, DisciplinaryPowers of Unions,
3 INn. & LAB. REL. REV. 483 (1950).
"In Packard Motor Car Co. v. NLRB, 330 U.S. 485 (1947), the Supreme Court
held that the Board had the power to recognize an organization of supervisors as the
appropriate bargaining unit and that supervisors were employees within the meaning
of the NLRA.
Following the Supreme Court's decision in Packard Motor Car, Congress took
supervisors out of the employee classification. Section 2(3) states: "the term 'employee' shall include any employee. . . but shall not include any individual employed
as . . .a supervisor . ... "
"Section 2(11) of the NLRA defines a supervisor as:
[A]ny individual having authority, in the interest of the employer,
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Recent Supreme Court decisions, 4 although not specifically dealing with § 8(b) (1)(B) or supervisor-members, provide valuable guidance regarding the legitimate exercise of union discipline of employees. NLRB v. Allis-Chalmers ManufacturingCo.' 5 is the most notable
Supreme Court decision involving union discipline of employeemembers. Utilizing the provisions of § 8(b) (1) (A),' 6 the Court found
that employee union members who crossed picket lines during an
authorized strike were subject to union fines. Unlike § 8(b)(1)(B)
which provides protection for an employer and his representatives,
§ 8(b) (1)(A) applies to union restraint or coercion against "employees." The Court acknowledged that permissible limits of union discipline are not clearly drawn and pointed out that "[i]t is highly
unrealistic to regard § 8(b)(1), and particularly its words 'restrain
and coerce,' as precisely and unambiguously covering the union conduct involved in this case."' 7 Rejecting a literal interpretation of
§ 8(b)(1)(A), the Supreme Court resorted to the legislative history of
that section and concluded that Congress did not limit the internal
to hire, transfer, suspend, lay off, recall, promote, discharge, assign,
reward, or discipline other employees, or responsibility to direct them,
or to adjust their grievances, or effectively to recommend such action,
if in connection with the foregoing, the exercise of such authority is
not of a merely routine or clerical nature, but requires the use of
independent judgment.
29 U.S.C. § 152(11) (1970).
However, the actual performance of various prerogatives under § 2(3) did not, in
itself, bring a person within the supervisory definition. See, e.g., NLRB v. Quincy Steel
Casting Co., 200 F.2d 293 (1st Cir. 1952); Ohio Power Co. v. NLRB, 176 F.2d 385 (6th
Cir.), cert. denied, 338 U.S. 899 (1949); Samborn Telephone Co., Inc., 140 N.L.R.B.
512 (1963); West Virginia Pulp & Paper Co., 122 N.L.R.B. 738 (1958).
At the same time, the Board often went beyond the duties listed in § 2(3) and
considered other relevant factors. See United States Gypsum Co., 119 N.L.R.B. 1415
(1958) (ratio of supervisors to employees is important); In re Allen-Morrison Sign Co.,
Inc., 79 N.L.R.B. 904 (1948) (higher wages and greater seniority may be taken into
account to determine supervisory status).
"See, e.g., NLRB v. Boeing Co., 412 U.S. 67 (1973); Scofield v. NLRB, 394 U.S.
423 (1969); NLRB v. Industrial Union of Marine & Shipbuilding Workers, 391 U.S.
418 (1968).
'388 U.S. 175 (1967).
"Section 8(b)(1)(A) provides:
It shall be an unfair labor practice for a labor organization or its
agents-(1) to restrain or coerce (A) employees in the exercise of rights
guaranteed in section 157 of this title [§ 7 of the NLRA]: Provided,
that this paragraph shall not impair the right of a labor organization
to prescribe its own rules with respect to the acquisition or retention
of membership therein . . ..
29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(1)(A) (1970).
'1388 U.S. at 179.
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affairs of unions in situations other than where the union rules affected a member's employment status. Thus, the Allis-Chalmers decision held that § 8(b)(1)(A) assures union freedom to regulate
wholly internal union affairs.' 8 However, the Court only dealt with a
situation in which the fined employees enjoyed full and active union
membership,' 9 as opposed to supervisor-members who may have only
retained limited membership. 0 The question of whether union prohibitions may lawfully be applied to members other than "employees"
was not answered by the Court.
While the Supreme Court in Allis-Chalmers noted that
§ 8(b)(1)(A) will not prohibit union rules relating to internal union
affairs, it observed that the section may nevertheless be applicable
where the union rule affects obligations external to the employeeunion relationship.2' The Court did not specifically indicate whether
"Two later decisions by the Supreme Court reiterated the language of AllisChalmers and further expounded the doctrine developed in that case. In NLRB v.
Industrial Union of Marine & Shipbuilding Workers, 391 U.S. 418 (1968), the Court
found a § 8(b)(1)(A) violation where the union disciplined an employee-member for
filing an unfair labor charge with the Board. The Court of Appeals had held that an
employee must exhaust all available union remedies before he files with the Board.
Id. at 423. Conceding that under Allis-Chalmers a union is free to regulate its internal
affairs, the Court, however, went on to say that when a union penalizes a member for
filing an unfair labor practice, other considerations of public policy come into play.
Id. at 424. Here, the overriding concern of the Court was that access to the Board must
remain unimpeded, and therefore the union violated § 8(b)(1)(A). Id. at 424-26.
Shortly after deciding Marine Workers, the Supreme Court was faced with an
analogous situation in Scofield v. NLRB, 394 U.S. 423 (1969). The case involved union
discipline of certain employee-members who refused to bank incentive-plan earnings
which went beyond the ceiling imposed by union rules. The Court, in upholding the
Board and the Seventh Circuit, found that the union rule did not upset the collective
bargaining process, did not imply any discrimination by the employer against the
employees, and "representled] no dereliction by the union of its duty of fair representation." Id. at 436. The union advanced each one of these arguments before the Court,
and the majority considered them separately as important policy considerations under
§ 8(b)(1)(A). Admitting that the union rule affected the interests of the employer,
employee, and the union, the Court nevertheless held that this in itself did not violate
§ 8(b)(1)(A) unless some impairment of a mandatory labor policy could be shown. Id.
"1388 U.S. at 196.
2'See note 5 supra.
"In Radio Officer's Union v. NLRB, 347 U.S. 17 (1954), the Supreme Court held
that the purpose of § 8(b)(1)(A) and an overall policy of the NLRA was to "insulate
employees' jobs from organizational rights." Id. at 40. Thus, if the union rules affected
the employees' rights protected under § 7 of the NLRA or called for coercive attempts
to force the employees into or out of union membership, a violation of § 8(b)(1) (A)
would be found. See Minneapolis Star & Tribune Co., 109 N.L.R.B. 727 (1954); Printz
Leather Co., 94 N.L.R.B. 1312 (1951); In re Maritime Union, 78 N.L.R.B. 971,
enforced, 175 F.2d 686 (2d Cir. 1949).
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this internal-external distinction applied to supervisory personnel in
whom both management and the union may have legitimate rights
of control. Therefore, the Board was left with the question of the
applicability of the Allis-Chalmers decision to alleged union violations of § 8(b)(1)(B), specifically involving supervisory personnel.
Prior to 1968, the Board had applied literally the provisions of
§ 8(b)(1)(B). Violations were found only in cases where the union
attempted to force the employer into dismissing supervisors, foremen, or collective bargaining representatives who were too tough on
the union.2 However, the Board subsequently expanded the coverage
of § 8(b) (1)(B) in San Francisco-OaklandMailers Union2 to include
"indirect" restraint upon the employer by discipline of supervisors
and foremen who were union members. 25 In that case management
filed an unfair labor practice charge with the Board when the union
attempted to fine company foremen for the manner in which they
interpreted the collective bargaining agreement.26 The Board rejected
However, Allis-Chalmers appears to be the first Supreme Court decision to specifically point out the "internal-external" distinction. The Scofield and Marine Workers'
decisions also explicitly mentioned "internal [union] affairs," 391 U.S. at 424, and
"external enforcement of union rules," 394 U.S. at 428.
-'-Section 8(b)(1)(B) provides: "It shall be an unfair labor practice for a labor
organization or its agents . . . to restrain or coerce . . . an employer in the selection
of his representatives for the purposes of collective bargaining or the adjustment of
grievances." 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(1)(B) (1970).
22
See, e.g., Orange Belt Dist. Council of Painters No. 48, 152 N.L.R.B. 1136 (1965);
Local 986, Teamsters Union, 145 N.L.R.B. 1511 (1964); Los Angeles Cloak Joint Bd.,
ILGWU, 127 N.L.R.B. 1543 (1960).
21172 N.L.R.B. 2173 (1968).
:"The Board included foremen as supervisory personnel. The status of supervisors
under the NLRA is determined by an individual's duties, not by his title or employment classification. See, e.g., NLRB v. Bardahl Oil Co., 399 F.2d 365 (8th Cir. 1968);
NLRB v. Armstrong Tire & Rubber Co., 228 F.2d 159 (5th Cir. 1955). Thus, if foremen
have the power to act as employer representatives and to exercise independent judg-

ment, they may achieve supervisory status. See C.
LAw 204 (1971).

MORRIS, THE DEVELOPING LABOR

'The collective bargaining agreement contained provisions which explicitly stated
that the foremen were not subject to "fine, discipline, or expulsion" by the union for
any act which was "within the scope of their authority." 172 N.L.R.B. at 2175. The
Board emphasized that by initiating disciplinary procedures against the foremen, the
union was disregarding the express provisions of the collective bargaining agreement.
Id. at 2182. The union argued that its investigation of the charges was to determine if,
in fact, the foremen were acting within the scope of their authority. The Board stated
that the union's investigation was a "unilateral" act which violated other provisions
of the collective bargaining agreement, specifically a clause that called for a special
standing committee or an arbitrator to determine the scope of the foremen's authority.
Id.
The union also contended that by incorporating the international union by-laws
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the union's argument that an investigation by the union of the
charges against the foremen-members and the subsequent discipline
was within the proviso of § 8(b)(1)(A) and was therefore a lawful
means of internal union control.Y Denying the applicability of AllisChalmers, the Board emphatically stated that the union was not
charged with a § 8(b)(1)(A) violation, but rather an unfair labor
practice under § 8(b)(1) (B) .21The Board found that "the Respondent
were designed to change the employer's repreunion's actions
sentatives from persons representing the viewpoint of management to
persons responsive or subservient to the Respondent's will. ' '28 In the
Board's opinion, union restraint upon a supervisor or foreman could
be an effective indirect weapon in denying an employer his rights
guaranteed by § 8(b)(1)(B) and was thus a violation of the NLRA as
certainly as direct union restraint.
The protection afforded management under § 8(b)(1)(B) was
expanded by the Board in decisions following Oakland Mailers.Y In
each of those decisions the Board referred to the language of Oakland
Mailers and noted that supervisors and foremen who possessed responsibilities relating to collective bargaining or grievance adjustment
were employer representatives within the meaning of § 8(b)(1)(B).3
into the collective agreement, the local could unilaterally determine certain differences
arising between the employer and the local. Thus, the union felt that it could enforce
these by-laws as "legitimate internal union affairs" independent of the other contractual provisions. The Board rejected this argument and held that by the terms of the
collective bargaining agreement the union had "bargained away" any legitimate control it had over the foremen. Id. The Board found that since the contractual provisions
showed conclusively that the foremen were to be part of management, the union's
attempt to harass the employer's representatives by citing them to appear before the
executive committee was violative of § 8(b)(1)(B). Id. at 2183.
1Id. at 2182.
21Id. Section 8(b)(1)(A) deals with union restraint or coercion upon an employee
while § 8(b)(1)(B) provides the same protection for the employer and his representatives.
"More recent decisions have also pointed to the "indirect restraint" language of
OaklandMailersand have held unions responsible for interference with the employer's
representatives. See, e.g., Meat Cutters Union, Local 81, 185 N.L.R.B. 884 (1970),
enforced, 458 F.2d 794 (D.C. Cir. 1972); New Mexico Dist. Council of Carpenters, 176
N.L.R.B. 797 (1969), enforced, 454 F.2d 1116 (10th Cir. 1972).
"See Toledo Locals 15-P and 272, Lithographers, 175 N.L.R.B. 1072 (1969),
enforced, 437 F.2d 55 (6th Cir. 1971). Toledo Locals involved a union charge that a
department superintendent and two shift foremen had violated the provisions of the
collective bargaining agreement by allowing a smaller number of men to work than was
called for by the agreement and for performing an inordinate amount of production
work. All three men were fined by the union and the company filed a complaint with
the Board. In finding that the union had violated § 8(b)(1)(B), the Board held that
even though the men were members of the union, they had sufficient supervisory
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Unfortunately, the Board has not indicated exactly what activities
will be deemed to be within the realm of collective bargaining and
grievance adjustment functions. Consequently, supervisory personnel
have been without substantive guidance as to the duties which they
owe to management, and the obligations they incur through union
membership.
In two recent proceedings, Local 134 IBEW" and Local 2150
IBEW,32 the Board was presented with the problem of whether a
union may discipline supervisor-members for crossing picket lines
during an economic strike. Adhering to the Oak land Mailersrationale
and the expanded coverage of § 8(b)(1)(B), the Board in each case
found the union action to be an indirect restraint upon the employer.
In IBEW Local 134 v. NLRB,3 when the Board petitioned for an
enforcement order,3 an en panel majority of the District of Columbia
Circuit Court of Appeals initially upheld the decision of the Board.
Subsequently, the District of Columbia Circuit, sitting en banc, reversed its previous holding in IBEW Local 134 and denied enforcement. The Seventh Circuit, in NLRB v. IBEW Local 2150,3 however,
granted the Board's enforcement petition, thus creating a circuit
court conflict over the limits of union discipline of supervisory personnel during an economic strike.
Both the District of Columbia Circuit and the Seventh Circuit
cases involved union discipline of supervisors and foremen for crossing picket lines to do struck work. 3 In each decision, the union represented rank-and-file employees under the terms of a collective bargaining agreement between the union and the employer.Y The union
had permitted employees who were elevated to supervisory status to
remain members of the union. 38 After the union initiated the strike, 9
capacities to make them likely future representatives of management and the company
was entitled to rely on them as such.
3'192 N.L.R.B. 85 (1971).
3192 N.L.R.B. 77 (1971).
=83 L.R.R.M. 2582 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
"Section 10(e) of the NLRA states: "The Board shall have the power to petition
any court of appeals of the United States. . . for the enforcement of such order .
29 U.S.C. § 160(e) (1970).
3183 L.R.R.M. 2827 (7th Cir. 1973).
"The common facts of each case will be dealt with here. IBEW Local 134 actually
involved two separate cases which were consolidated for the en banc decision. See
IBEW U-4, Florida Power and Light Co., 193 N.L.R.B. 30 (1971); IBEW Local 134,
Illinois Bell, 192 N.L.R.B. 85 (1971).
1183 L.R.R.M. at 2583; 83 L.R.R.M. at 2828.
383 L.R.R.M. at 2585-86; 83 L.R.R.M. at 2828. Those supervisor-members holding
"participating" withdrawal cards were obligated to pay a monthly fee equivalent to
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a number of supervisors and foremen crossed the picket lines and
reported for work.40 Thereafter, those supervisory personnel who did
report for work were charged by the union with performing rank-andfile struck work against union regulations and were either fined or
expelled from union membership.' The Board found that the union
action had violated § 8(b)(1)(B) and ordered the union to cease and
desist. 2
union dues and in exchange received certain death, pension, and disability benefits.
Holders of "honorary" withdrawal cards had no obligation to the union nor did they
receive any benefits, but if they returned to the ranks of the regular employees, the
withdrawal cards assured the supervisors that there would be a resumption of benefits.
In IBEW Local 2150, the union dropped the charges against two supervisors who did
not possess withdrawal cards, but the Board found that the formal charges against
these men were enough to warrant a violation of § 8(b)(1)(B). 83 L.R.R.M. at 2829,
n.6.
39In both decisions, the circuit courts found that the strikes were purely of an
economic nature.
"°83 L.R.R.M. at 2585-86; 83 L.R.R.M. at 2828.
1
1d. In the FloridaPower and Light Co. case of IBEW Local 134, the District of
Columbia Circuit found that the terms of the collective bargaining agreement contained certain union concessions regarding discipline of supervisor-members:
It is further agreed that employees in [supervisory] classifications
have definite management responsibilities and are the direct representatives of the Company . . . . Employees in these classifications
• . . are not to be jacked up or disciplined through Union machinery
for the acts they may have performed as supervisors in the Company's
interest.
83 L.R.R.M. at 2585. However, in the Illinois Bell case of IBEW Local 134, there was
no provision in the collective bargaining agreement concerning discipline of supervisormembers. The only provision was a Letter of Understanding which stated:
[A]ny allegiance they [District Installation Supervisors] owe to the
union shall not affect their judgment in the disposition of their supervisory duties. Since they will have under their supervision employees
who are members of unions other than Local 134 and perhaps some
with no union affiliations whatever, the company will expect the same
impartial judgment that it demands from all Supervisory personnel.
Id. at 2586.
4Id. at 2587; Id. at 2828. In IBEW Local 2150, the Board also ordered the union
to take other affirmative action such as: (1) notify the supervisors of the Board's
decision; (2) post copies of the Board's decision in the union offices and meeting halls;
(3) notify the Regional Director on what steps have been taken by the union to alleviate
the situation. 192 N.L.R.B. at 83. However, in Illinois Bell, the union was required to
pay back the fines collected from the supervisors and foremen. Id. at 87. The Seventh
Circuit decision did not consider repayment of fines since the union suspended the
penalties upon the condition that the supervisory personnel were not found to be
involved in a similar situation for the next two years. Id. at 77.
Despite the similarities, certain factual distinctions existed between the circuit
court cases. In the Illinois Bell decision of IBEW Local 134, the District of Columbia
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The District of Columbia Circuit's primary objection to the
Board's decision stemmed from a disagreement with the Board as to
how § 8(b)(1)(B) should be interpreted. The court concluded that a
literal reading of § 8(b)(1)(B) showed that Congress only wished to
prevent unions from either restricting an employer's free choice in
selecting his representatives or restraining those personnel whom the
employer had chosen to represent him.Y The court recognized the
doctrine set out by the Board in San Francisco-OaklandMailers
Union44 but held that it was not applicable in the present case. Accircuit found that the union was recognized as the bargaining agent not only for the
rank-and-file employees, but also for a number of supervisors and foremen. 83
L.R.R.M. at 2584. However, many of the high-ranking supervisors were not part of the
bargaining unit. Id. at 2584-86. In FloridaPower and Light Co., the District of Columbia Circuit was only concerned with those supervisors who were not represented in the
collective bargaining unit, while in Illinois Bell the circuit court was presented with
supervisors both in and out of the collective bargaining unit. 83 L.R.R.M. at 2584-86.
However, the Seventh Circuit found in IBEW Local 2150 that none of the supervisormembers involved were members of the collective bargaining unit, and the union did
not represent them in negotiations with the company. 83 L.R.R.M. at 2828.
Moreover, in IBEW Local 134, the supervisor-members were specifically told by
the employer that he would like them to report for work during the strike, but the final
decision whether to work or to respect the strike was left to the discretion of each
individual supervisor. 83 L.R.R.M. at 2586. Unlike the District of Columbia case, in
IBEW Local 2150, the company did not give the supervisors and foremen the option
of staying home during the strike. 83 L.R.R.M. at 2828 n.3. The company argued at
the trial level that it had indeed requested all supervisory personnel to report for work.
The record before the Seventh Circuit was not clear on this point but it is evident that
the argument was not controverted by the union. The court stated, however, that the
Board's case would be weakened if the company gave the supervisors the option of
whether or not to report for work. The court noted that if the employer did give that
option to his supervisory personnel or left the choice to the union, it would be difficult
for the employer to complain about any conflict of loyalties problem. On the other
hand, since there was no such option given and even if the company did not directly
order the men to cross the picket lines, the court held that it would be consistent with
the company's expectation that the supervisors would report for work.
1183 L.R.R.M. at 2587. The court referred to various comments in the legislative
history of the Taft-Hartley Amendments to the NLRA.
This unfair labor practice referred to is not perhaps of tremendous
importance,but employees cannot say to their employer, We do not
like Mr. X, we will not meet Mr. X. You have to send us Mr. Y ...
You have to fire Foreman Jones. We do not like Foreman Jones, and
therefore you have to fire him, or we will not go to work.
Id. quoting 93 CONG. REc. 837 (1947) (remarks by Senator Taft).
11172 N.L.R.B. 2173 (1968). The District of Columbia Circuit stated:
|Allthough the Oakland Mailers doctrine unquestionably expanded
Section 8(b)(1)(B) to cover situations not envisioned by the section's
enactors, we have recognized and continue to recognize that its basic
rationale is consistent with the purposes of Section 8(b)(1)(B) . . ..
83 L.R.R.M. at 2588.
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cording to the District of Columbia Circuit, the controlling distinction between Oakland Mailers and IBEW Local 134 was the difference between a supervisor being disciplined for the way in which he
interpreted or performed his collective bargaining or grievance functions, and a supervisor being disciplined for performing rank-and-file
work during a strike.15 In the court's opinion:
when a supervisor foresakes his supervisory role to do rankand-file work ordinarily the domain of non-supervisory employees, he is no longer acting as a management representative
and no longer merits any immunity from discipline.46
Thus, the basic dispute did not involve contract interpretation or
grievance settlement, but instead evidenced a typical economic clash
between union and employer. Since it believed § 8(b) (1) (B) applied
only to bargaining representatives and grievance adjustors, and because the union action in the present situation did not detrimentally
affect the employer," the court found that the Board's reading of
§ 8(b) (1)(B) was wholly outside the scope of the NLRA.
The Board had also found that Allis-Chalmers" did not apply to
the instant case because the Supreme Court dealt only with
§ 8(b)(1)(A) and not § 8(b)(1)(B). The District of Columbia Circuit
categorically rejected this argument and said that Allis-Chalmers
and IBEW Local 134 were factually indistinguishable. 9 Conceding
4Id. at 2589-90.
Id. at 2591.
"Id. In Oakland Mailers, the Board held that to subject supervisors to union
discipline in such situations would have the effect of making supervisors the representatives of the union. See text following note 26 supra.The District of Columbia Circuit
took the opposite view and held that union discipline of supervisor-members would
cause the supervisors to direct their sympathies away from the union and make their
allegiance with management much closer. 83 L.R.R.M. at 2591. As the court pointed
out:
Therefore, not only is there no reason to conclude that those supervisors . . . who were expelled from the union will be more lenient with
the union when they are called upon to interpret the contract, adjust
grievances, or engage in collective bargaining in the future. Just the
opposite is likely to be the case.
Id. The court found that in effect the union discipline did not create any ill-will on
the part of the employer and therefore, the supervisors were drawn even closer to
management.
"INLRB v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 175 (1967).
"183 L.R.R.M. at 2593. The court pointed out that in both cases the union attempted to fine certain members for crossing picket lines during a lawful economic
strike. The only factual difference was that in Allis-Chalmers the fined members were
regular employees, while IBEW Local 134 involved union discipline of supervisory
personnel.
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that the Supreme Court was only concerned with § 8(b)(1)(A), the
circuit court pointed out that the basis of Allis-Chalmers rested upon
a definition of "restrain or coerce" which is common to both sections. 10 Relying on the Allis-Chalmers decision, the District of Columbia Circuit ruled that the union discipline was exercised within the
proviso of § 8(b)(1)(A) and that the Board's decision in Oakland
Mailers did not apply to a situation where union rules reflected a
congressional labor policy legitimizing internal union regulations."
Referring to the legislative history of the Taft-Hartley amendments, the District of Columbia Circuit drew two conclusions from a
comparative analysis of the various sections of the NLRA.12 First,
supervisors were excluded from the NLRA under § 2(3) primarily
because Congress recognized that when the supervisors and foremen
became union members they were subject to the control and influence
0Id. at 2594. It should be noted that these are the words of the District of Columbia
Circuit Court and not the Supreme Court. In Allis-Chalmers, there is no mention of
§ 8(b)(1)(B) specifically. The circuit court drew its support from Justice Brennan's
statement that: "[ilt is highly unrealistic to regard § 8(b)(1) and particularly its
words 'restrain and coerce' as precisely and unambigously covering the union conduct
involved in this case." 388 U.S. at 179. However, Justice Brennan went on to say that
the legislative history of a section may not be disregarded merely because it is arguably
that a provision may unambigously embrace conduct called into question. "We have
applied that principle to the construction of § 8(b)(1)(A) itself." Id.
1183 L.R.R.M. at 2595. The Board argued that a distinction existed between union
rules that affected only internal employee-union relationships and rules that primarily
affected the employer, who is external to the union-employee affiliation. Thus, if the
union discipline adversely affected the employer, it violated the provisions of
§ 8(b)(1)(B).
Again applying the Supreme Court's decision in Allis-Chalmers, the District of
Columbia Circuit found that this "internal-external distinction" could not be "squared
with the holding in Allis-Chalmers." Id. The court admitted that the union discipline
in Allis-Chalmers had an external effect on the employer. However, the external effect
was one of insuring union solidarity, thus giving the union a greater bargaining position
against the employer rather than the employer feeling the effects of losing the loyalty
of his representatives.
"2Prior to the 1947 amendments, in Packard Motor Car Co. v. NLRB, 330 U.S. 485
(1947), the Supreme Court included supervisors within the "employee" classification
of the NLRA. With the enactment of § 2(3), Congress recognized the conflict of loyalties problem and removed supervisors from that classification. 29 U.S.C. § 152(3)
(1970). See note 12 supra. However, § 14(a) evidences a congressional policy to allow
workmen, including supervisors, to organize. Section 14(a) provides:
Nothing herein shall prohibit any individual employed as a supervisor
from becoming or remaining a member of a labor organization but no
employer subject to this Act. . . shall be compelled to deem individuals defined herein as supervisors as employees for the purpose of any
law, either national or local relating to collective bargaining . ..
29 U.S.C. § 164 (1970).
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of the rank-and-file union5 3 Second, by allowing foremen and supervisors to unionize under § 14(a) and by permitting employers, if they
so desired, to continue to bargain collectively with supervisory personnel, Congress gave employers an option. 4 Drawing upon these two
observations, the court concluded by saying:
[O]nce an employer permits his supervisors to join unions or
agrees to engage in collective bargaining with unionized supervisors, he no longer can claim their undivided loyalty in every
employer-union dispute except to the extent the collective bargaining agreement ensures such loyalty ...- I'
In essence, if the employer allows his supervisors to become or remain
members of the union, and no other contractual provision prevails,
he waives his right to complete control over them, especially in a
situation such as an economic strike which calls for union solidarity."
Unlike the District of Columbia Circuit, the Seventh Circuit, in
IBEW Local 2150, 57 rejected a literal reading of § 8(b)(1)(B). The
court viewed the doctrine set out in Oakland Mailers as controlling
the question, reasoning that § 8(b)(1)(B) not only protects the employer from direct restraint upon his collective bargaining or grievance adjustment representatives, but also it encompasses indirect
restraint in the form of coercing supervisors to become more receptive
to union attitudes. 8
583 L.R.R.M. at 2598. Thus "Congress solved the conflict of loyalties problem by
giving management the right to make the would-be supervisors choose between union
loyalty. . . and management loyalty." Id.
51
1d. The employer could either allow his supervisors to unionize, thus resolving
the conflict of loyalty problem on a "give and take" basis, or he could refuse to select
his supervisors from the union ranks.

Id.

SThe District of Columbia Circuit referred to this as the "option approach." Id.
-783 L.R.R.M. 2827 (7th Cir. 1973).
11Id. See the Board's decision in San Francisco-Oakland Mailers Union, 172
N.L.R.B. 2173 (1968). This "substitution of attitudes" was meant to deal with the
situation where a supervisor, after being disciplined by the union, adopts a more prounion stance. Thus, in effect, the same purpose is accomplished as would be if the
union forced the employer to replace his representatives. In either case, the Board held
that this would be a violation of § 8(b)(1)(B).
The Seventh Circuit noted other Board decisions in which the Oakland Mailers
rationale was upheld. New Mexico Dist. Council of Carpenters, 176 N.L.R.B. 797
(1969), involved union discipline of supervisor-members for working for a company
which had no contract with the union. In Meat Cutters Union Local 81, 185 N.L.R.B.
884 (1970), the Board found a violation of § 8(b)(1)(B) where the union disciplined a
supervisor for following a company order instituting a new meat procurement plan
which would have reduced the number of jobs available to union members.
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The Seventh Circuit also flatly refused to apply the Supreme59
Court's decision in Allis-Chalmers to the facts of IBEWLocal 2150.
The court held that the Supreme Court only considered § 8(b)(1)(A)
in connection with employees who belonged to the union, not with
supervisors under § 8(b)(1)(B). 0 The union's desire to enforce its
internal rules and regulations was protected under § 8(b)(1)(A). 6'
However, § 8(b)(1)(B) encompassed a completely different interest.
The court held that when the union disciplined supervisors for crossing picket lines, this action affected employer representatives and
impaired a congressional policy which was imbedded into
§ 8(b) (1)(B).2
At the time § 8(b)(1)(B) was enacted, Congress did not spell out
exactly what tasks were within the area of collective bargaining or
grievance adjustment duties, 6 3 but the Seventh Circuit found that
supervisors perform managerial functions when they handle rankand-file work during a strike.6 4 The court decided that the company
5
must be able to call on all the resources at its disposal. When supervisors are asked by management to work during a strike, the tasks
It should be noted that the court acknowledged the District of Columbia Circuit's
en banc decision which was released just prior to the Seventh Circuit's opinion. However, the Seventh Circuit specifically rejected the en banc holding and referred only
to the prior en panel District of Columbia Circuit opinion. 83 L.R.R.M. at 2830 n.7.
11Id. at 2832. "Any suggestion that Allis-Chalmers has controlling significance...
must be rejected." Id. The District of Columbia Circuit found that Allis-Chalmers and
IBEW Local 134 were "indistinguishable" since both cases involved union discipline
of members for crossing union picket lines and that the Supreme Court construed the
meaning of "restrain and coerce" which is common to both §§ 8(b)(1)(A) and
8(b)(1)(B). See note 51 and accompanying text supra. The Seventh Circuit held that
even though the words "restrain and coerce" appear in both sections, lawful union
discipline of employees under § 8(b)(1)(A) does not imply that the union is free to
discipline management representatives without violating § 8(b)(1)(B).
"T he court stated that Allis-Chalmers and the instant case presented two entirely
different questions. In Allis-Chalmers, the Supreme Court was faced with the question
of whether union discipline of employees for crossing picket lines constituted a
§ 8(b)(1)(A) violation of the employees' rights under § 7 of the NLRA. Conversely,
the question before the Seventh Circuit was whether a violation of the employer's
rights under § 8(b)(1)(B) to select and retain his representatives existed when the
union disciplined the supervisor-members. Id.
"'See note 18 supra.
""Congress granted express protection to the employer-representative relationship
... 83 L.R.R.M. at 2833.
.
aCongress did set forth a number of criteria under § 2(11) which would be indicative of supervisory capacity. However, the application of these criteria does not automatically bring a person within the supervisory classification. See note 13 supra.
6183 L.R.R.M. at 2832.
6Id.
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performed by these men not only help to keep the business running
and meet the needs of the company's customers, but also "preserve
the company's clientele and good name from deterioration."6 In the
Seventh Circuit's view, such tasks are the heart of managerial functions and by allowing supervisors to retain membership in the union,
the company does not evidence a desire to allow the union to control
the actions of the supervisors and foremen.
While admitting that an employer may voluntarily lose a certain
amount of control over his representatives by allowing them to join a
union, the Seventh Circuit found that this did not mean the employer
waived his right to noninterference under § 8(b)(1)(B). G7 The court
referred to the facts of the case in question to point out that the
supervisors were not part of the collective bargaining agreement and
received only minimal benefits for their membership in the union."
Such participation in the union did not mean that the supervisors
were no longer representatives of management. Rather, if the company intended to waive its right of control over supervisors and foremen, the waiver must be in clear and unequivocal terms. Since there
was no indication in the record that the company had effected a clear
waiver, the court concluded that "the measure of union control over
supervisor-members in which the Company acquiesced is only that
which is without the reach of section 8(b) (1) (B). "69 Therefore, supervisory personnel were to be considered as management personnel and
were protected as such under the provisions of § 8(b)(1)(B).
The Seventh Circuit, by adhering to the Board's decision in
Oakland Mailers and subsequent cases, held that § 8(b)(1)(B) applied not only to employers but also to their representatives. The
District of Columbia Circuit, however, found that the expansion of
the scope of § 8(b)(1)(B) must be halted if that section is to be
applied in its proper perspective. Viewing the conflict of loyalties
problem surrounding § 8(b)(1)(B) in a light most conducive to a
desperately needed sense of continuity, the reasoning applied by the
Board and adopted by the Seventh Circuit appears to be the correct
approach.
'Id. The court pointed out that "management has traditionally relied upon supervisors. . . to pitch in and perform rank-and-file work in an attempt both to strengthen
its bargaining position and to preserve the enterprise from collapse." Id.
'Id. at 2833. The court cited to the District of Columbia's en panel decision for
support. See note 58 supra.
"Id.
"Id. The court stated that if it adopted the union's argument, the employer would
have absolutely no control over his supervisors. Under the union constitution, it is an
offense to work "in the interest of any organization or cause which is detrimental to,
or opposed to, the IBEW."
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The Supreme Court noted in Allis-Chalmers that the wording of
§ 8(b)(1) was far from clear and unambiguous.7 0 The Court also recognized that the legislative history of the NLRA could not be disregarded when construing the meaning of that section. 7' Thus,
§ 8(b)(1)(A) must be "construed in light of the fact that it 'is only
one of many interwoven sections in a complex Act, mindful of the
manifest purpose of Congress to fashion a coherent national labor
policy.' "72 The legislative history surrounding the enactment of
§ 2(3), which excludes supervisors from the employee classification,
and § 14(a) which relieves an employer from recognizing supervisors
as employees, seems to indicate that Congress wished to espouse an
overriding labor policy of including supervisory personnel within the
management realm. As the Senate and House committee reports illustrate, § 2(3) evidences a congressional intention to make the su73
pervisor's obligations to his employer the essential consideration.
Senator Taft remarked:
The committee felt that foremen either had to be part of management and not have any rights under the Wagner Act, or be
treated entirely as employees, and it was felt that the latter
course would result in a complete disruption of discipline and
productivity in the factories of the United States.74
While § 14(a) does not prohibit supervisors from organizing, it
specifically omits supervisors from coverage under the NLRA. 75 As
was noted in the dissent in the District of Columbia Circuit case, by
'"388
U.S. at 179.
71
See text following note 17 supra.
72388 U.S. at 179-80. See Scofield v. NLRB, 394 U.S. 423 (1969). "[Tlhese sections
form a web, of which section 8(b)(1)(A) is only a strand ....
" Id. at 428-29.
"See H.R. REP. No. 245, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 3-5 (1947). The House Report
contained the following comments:
If management is to be free to manage American industry as in the
past and to produce the goods on which depends our strength in war
and our standard of living always, then Congress must exclude foremen from the operation of the Labor Act, not only when they organize
into unions of the rank and file . . . but also when they organize into
unions that claim to be independent of the unions of the rank and file.

Id.

7t93 CONc. REC. 3952 (1947). Likewise, Seantor Ball remarked that it would not
make sense to allow foremen, who are an integral part of management, to be subjected
to the discipline of the unions of employees whom they supervise. 93 CONG. REC. 3837
(1947).
7
Section 14(a) provides: "[N]o employer . . . shall be compelled to deem individuals defined herein as supervisors as employees for the purpose of any law, either
national or local, relating to collective bargaining."
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specifically allowing supervisors to become or remain members of a
union, Congress was simply restating that supervisors were not
prevented from unionizing6 but was not attempting to solve the conflict of loyalties problem.
Since Congress wished to remove supervisors from the employee
classification and to include them as managerial personnel, it appears that an employer cannot waive control over his supervisory
personnel simply by allowing them to retain limited membership in
the union. 7 The Supreme Court in Allis-Chalmers pointed out that
no one section of the NLRA is complete standing by itself and that
78
each provision must be read in conjunction with all other sections.
The legislative history of §§ 8(b)(1), 14(a) and 2(3) show a strong
labor policy in favor of supervisory loyalty to management. The District of Columbia Circuit's reasoning that an employer may waive
control over his supervisors and foremen simply by allowing them to
retain union membership seems to contravene an express congres79
sional purpose.
Both the Seventh Circuit and the District of Columbia Circuit
recognized the rationale of the Board's decision in Oakland Mailers
as significantly broadening the scope of § 8(b)(1)(B).10 However, the
District of Columbia Circuit held in IBEW Local 134 that Oakland
Mailers was consistent with § 8(b)(1)(B) as long as the union discipline did not infringe upon a supervisor's collective bargaining or
grievance adjustment functions.8 The NLRB and the courts have
7

Judge MacKinnon stated that the first part of § 14(a) had a relatively minor
effect and was included only to make it clear that supervisors were still able to organize. 83 L.R.R.M. 2582, 2604-09 (1973) (dissenting opinion).
7The District of Columbia Circuit found that a reading of the various sections of
the NLRA showed that an employer could indeed make such a waiver. See note 54 and
accompanying text supra.
7
See text following note 70 supra.
7Judge Wright, speaking for the majority in IBEW Local 134, acknowledged that
§ 2(3) took supervisors out of the employee classification. He stated: "It is clear that
the supervisory exclusion § 2(3) was enacted precisely because Congress assumed that
when supervisors became union members they were obligated to those on the other side
... " However, Judge Wright leaned heavily on § 14(a) and seemed to consider that
section as practically nullifying the effects of § 2(3). "Congress solved the conflict of
loyalties problem by giving management the right to choose between union loyalty on
the one hand and management loyalty and supervisory status on the other hand." It
seems highly unlikely that § 2(3) is no more than a declaration that a conflict of
loyalty problem exists. As Judge MacKinnon pointed out in his dissent in IBEW Local
134, § 2(3) "[Wlas the legislative 'solution' to the conflict of loyalties problem." 83
L.R.R.M. at 2608.
"See notes 44 and 58 and accompanying text supra.
"See text following note 44 supra.
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often gone beyond the mere formal bargaining processes to protect
the employer and his representatives from union restraint or coercion.
Violations of § 8(b)(1)(B) have been found in cases where the union
disciplined supervisors for reporting to work in strike-crews smaller
than those called for in the collective bargaining agreement, 2 for
writing letters to the employees urging them to vote against the
union,8 3 and for implementing a company policy which would have
eventually limited the number of jobs available to union members.84
In each decision, the most important consideration was that the
union, by disciplining the supervisors and foremen, was "driving a
wedge" between the employer and the supervisors which nullified the
supervisors' ability to carry out their responsibilities as management
representatives. 5 If the union were allowed to discipline supervisor"ZToledo Locals 15-P and 272, Lithographers, 175 N.L.R.B. 1072 (1969), enforced,
437 F.2d 55 (6th Cir. 1971).
81New Mexico Dist. Council of Carpenters, 177 N.L.R.B. 500 (1968), enforced, 454
F.2d 1116 (10th Cir. 1972). The decision here involved two cases, No. 128-70 and No.
129-70. The District of Columbia Circuit Court attempted to distinguish No. 128-70
by saying:
• . . compliance by the supervisor with the union's demands would
have meant quitting his job with the employer, thereby having "the
effect of depriving the Company of the services of its selected representative" . . . . The cash thus falls close to the original rationale of
§ 8(b)(1)(B) ....
83 L.R.R.M. at 2589 n.19. However, it is submitted that in both situations involved in
the present cases, there is a very real danger that union discipline will have the same
effect. Even though the employer in Illinois Bell was benevolent enough to allow the
supervisors who stayed home during the strike to return to their jobs, other supervisors
may not be as fortunate. Section 14(a) states that an employer is under no duty to
recognize supervisors as employees for the purpose of collective bargaining. Thus, if
the employer finds that he cannot count on his supervisory personnel and no other
contractual provision prevails, the company may have no choice but to "deprive itself"
of its selected representatives because of the indirect restraint provided by the union.
"Meat Cutters Union Local 81, 185 N.L.R.B. 884 (1970), enforced, 458 F.2d 794
(D.C. Cir. 1972). Judge Wright in IBEW Local 134 attempted to distinguish the Meat
Cutters case. He explained that the court's decision in Meat Cutters rested primarily
on the fact that "the conduct which prompted disciplinary action consisted of the
representative's efforts to discharge his management responsibilities." 83 L.R.R.M. at
2592. Judge Wright went on to say: "The discipline of the supervisor in Meat Cutters
was not totally unrelated to the performance of grievance settlement functions since
by fining the supervisor the union was undercutting a clause in the contract .... "
Id. The court seemed to forget that in the Florida Power and Light Co. decision of
IBEW Local 134, the collective bargaining agreement spelled out that the union would
not discipline supervisors for "acts they may have performed as supervisors in the
Company's interest." Id. at 2585. See note 41 supra.
'5"[T~here would have been serious doubt thereafter as to whether he
[supervisor] could represent the Company in a bona fide manner against the Union
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members for performing managerial duties, it would appear that the

union could effectively impede the collective bargaining process.
The District of Columbia Circuit's holding that supervisors
who do rank-and-file struck work are not performing management
functions seems to stop short of a complete analysis of the situation.
During a non-normal period such as an economic strike, the employer
must be able to count on his supervisory personnel to keep the business functioning. While the Supreme Court has recognized that a
strike is the ultimate weapon in the union's arsenal, and that the
power to fine or expel strikebreakers is a legitimate union prerogative,86 the Court has also noted that "labor legislation is peculiarly
the product of a legislative compromise of strongly held views."" It
appears that Congress reached such a compromise by recognizing the
employer's freedom to control his representatives under the provisions of the NLRA. 8 One of the employer's rights is to attempt to
keep the business running during the work stoppage. When supervisors and foremen decide to cross the union's picket lines to perform
struck work, the tasks they perform, whether normal supervisory duties or rank-and-file jobs, seem to fall within the realm of managerial
functions."
Although Allis-Chalmers and more recent Supreme Court decisions do not specifically apply to the conflict of loyalties problem, the
approach taken by the Supreme Court demonstrates an interesting
relationship between §§ 8(b)(1)(A) and 8(b)(1)(B). In Scofield v.
NLRB, 9 the Court reaffirmed its holding in Allis-Chalmers by saying
that the decision distinguished between external and internal administration of union rules.9' The internal enforcement of a union's regulations by the use of fines or expulsion continues to be a proper
method of discipline against employee-members.1 2 However, if the
in other matters where their interests were adverse." Meat Cutters Union Local 81 v.
NLRB, 458 F.2d 794, 799 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
I'NLRB v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 175, 181 (1967). See also Summers,
Legal Limitations on Union Discipline, 64 HAlv. L. REv. 1049 (1951).
11388 U.S. at 179. See also Local 1976, Carpenters Union v. NLRB, 357 U.S. 93,
99-100 (1958).
Y'Congress recognized that the unions could not completely overwhelm the employer without disrupting productivity in the United States. See note 73 and accompanying text supra.Thus, while acknowledging that unions should have certain economic
weapons at their disposal, Congress also protected the employer and his representatives from undue union pressure. See note 74 and accompanying text supra.
"See note 66 and accompanying text supra.
"394 U.S. 423 (1969). See note 18 supra.
"1Id. at 428.
"See NLRB v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 175, 196 (1967). "[T]he relevant
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union rule violates or detrimentally affects an important policy of the
federal labor laws, the rule may not be enforced by either fine or
expulsion without violating the provisions of § 8(b)(1) .1 It seems
that the NLRA does evidence a strong labor policy that supervisors
are considered to be managerial personnel.2 4 Allis-Chalmers and subsequent Supreme Court decisions considered § 8(b)(1)(A) only in
connection with the congressional intent to allow unions to promulgate and administer internal rules and regulations of membership
and conduct.25 Conversely, by examining the scope of § 8(b)(1)(B),
it appears that Congress granted express protection to the relationship between the employer and his representatives and did not intend
to permit the unions either to treat management personnel as employees or to interfere with the supervisors' duties as representatives
of the company."
Congress could not have foreseen all the circumstances within
which supervisor-members would be subject to union discipline or
expulsion. The Seventh Circuit expressed two factual caveats which
might have made a difference in the amount of protection given to
an employer and his representatives under § 8(b)(1)(B).17 First, the
absence of a specific request by the employer that the supervisors and
foremen report for work during the strike may evidence a company
policy to relinquish a certain amount of control over supervisory personnel.2 Secondly, where supervisors and foremen enjoy full union
benefits and participate in the collective bargaining unit, the employer may have acquiesced to union regulation of the supervisormembers."
inquiry here is . . .whether the Taft-Hartley Amendments prohibited disciplinary
measures against a full member who crossed his union's picket line." Id.
'"394 U.S. at 429.
"See note 73 and accompanying text supra.
"5 See NLRB v. Boeing Co., 412 U.S. 67 (1973). The Court was presented with the
question of whether Congress intended to give the Board authority to regulate the
size of union fines or to establish standards with respect to the reasonableness of the
fine. In the course of its opinion, the Court referred to Allis-Chalmers and Scofield
and said that the underlying basis for its decision in both cases was that the provisions
of § 8(b)(1)(A) "were not intended by Congress to apply to the imposition by the union
of fines not affecting the employer-employee relationship and not otherwise prohibited
by the Act." Id. at 73.
"'It seems quite clear from the legislative history of the Taft-Hartley Amendments
that Congress expressly avoided this type of problem by excluding supervisors from
the employee classification. See note 73 and accompanying text supra.
1183 L.R.R.M. at 2828 n.3, 2833.
"SIn the Illinois Bell case of IBEW Local 134, the supervisors were given the option
of whether to cross the picket lines. 83 L.R.R.M. at 2586.
1183 L.R.R.M. at 2833. Again in Illinois Bell, certain foremen were represented in
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Referring to an employer's request that his supervisory personnel
report for work, in both IBEW Local 134 and IBEW Local 2150 the
supervisors were given the option of whether to cross the picket
lines.0' When management expresses a desire for the supervisory personnel to return to work during the strike, it becomes extremely difficult to distinguish between a specific request and an option. This
situation confronts a supervisor with the possibility of repercussions
from both sides. If the employer finds himself conceding to union
demands because his business is paralyzed, a certain amount of antipathy may arise toward those supervisors who did not report for
work. In terms of job security, the employer controls the supervisor's
future as a management representative. Conversely, by crossing
picket lines to perform struck work, supervisor-members are vulnerable not only to union harassment and bad feelings, but also to possible fines and expulsion. Even if these situations are improbable, the
supervisor who is faced with such a choice may view the consequences
as distinct possibilities. Thus, supervisory personnel should not be
penalized for choosing employment security over limited union membership.
The Seventh Circuit also found that supervisors who enjoy full
union benefits and are members of the collective bargaining unit may
be subject to union fines or discipline.' However, few of the supervisory personnel involved in the present cases were full union members,
and they did not enjoy many of the substantial gains derived from
union participation. 2 Under these circumstances it would be extremely hazardous for the courts to allow the union to discipline these
men and claim full control over supervisory activities which are directly linked to management duties.10 3 Alternative approaches would
be to either acknowledge those supervisors who do possess full union
membership rights as employees within the meaning of the NLRA, °4
or only to allow union control of supervisory personnel where such
control is expressly granted by the terms of the collective bargaining
the collective bargaining unit and by the terms of the agreement were "required to
become and remain members" of the union. 83 L.R.R.M. at 2585.
"'See note 42 supra.
'83 L.R.R.M. at 2833.
"°2See note 38 supra.
"lThe courts would not only be attempting to distinguish between what is and
what is not full union membership, but they would also appear to be contravening an
express congressional principle. See note 73 supra.
"'This seems highly unlikely unless amendments to the existing Act are made
since supervisors are now specifically excluded from its provisions. 29 U.S.C. § 164
(1970).
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agreement or by a separate contract. Since the former choice is not
available under the NLRA, it appears that the court should look to
the provisions of the collective bargaining agreement.
If the responsibilities and duties of the employer's representatives
are specifically spelled out in the collective bargaining agreement or
by a separate contract, any conflict of loyalties problem may be
solved by contractual interpretation.'0 5 In IBEW Local 134, the parties to the collective bargaining agreement recognized that the supervisors were management representatives and that the union could not
discipline supervisory personnel for any acts which they would perform as supervisors in the interest of the company.106 It appears that
there is nothing to prevent the employer from conceding a certain
07
amount of union regulation of supervisor-members.
The idea of a distinct waiver of the employer's control over his
representatives is not a new one. The District of Columbia Circuit
found that as long as management allowed its supervisors and foremen to retain their membership in the union, the company forfeited
the right to completely control those supervisor-members. 01 Perhaps
a better approach was suggested by the Seventh Circuit: "If the Company waived the protection to which it is entitled under Section
8(b)(1)(B), that waiver must be found in clear and unmistakable
terms."'00 Since the NLRA does not include any provisions concerning the extent to which a union may control supervisory personnel,
but does provide protection for an employer and his representatives,
the initial presumption should be that supervisors are managerial
personnel and that they may not be disciplined by the union for
crossing union picket lines to perform struck work during an economic strike.
THOMAS
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WOTRING

"'Courts have long recognized that the key to preventing industrial strife is to urge
the parties to bargain collectively and to specifically set forth their agreement in the
terms of the collective bargaining contract. The Supreme Court noted that the policy
of the NLRA is to "protect commerce 'by encouraging the practice and procedure of
collective bargaining ....
.' Allied Chemical & Alkali Workers, Local 1 v. Pittsburgh
Plate Glass Co., 404 U.S. 157, 163 (1971).
"'See note 41 supra. The problem here was that the agreement did not spell out
what actually constituted "supervisory duties."
10The Supreme Court has often held that upon such permissible matters "each
party is free to bargain or not to bargain, and to agree or not to agree." NLRB v.
Wooster Div. of Borg-Warner Corp., 356 U.S. 342, 349 (1958).
'"See text following note 53 supra.
1083 L.R.R.M. at 2833.

